EthicsVsMorals

Is it in any way useful to draw a distinction between Ethics and Morals? Are they not, after all, synonymous? Doesn't one pretty much imply the other? Let us answer the three foregoing questions, "Yes, No, and No" respectively and see whether such a position is defensible.

The root word for Ethical is the Greek "ethos," meaning "character." The root word for Moral is Latin "mos," meaning "custom."

Both words are broadly defined in contemporary English as having to do with right and wrong conduct. Character and custom, however, provide two very different standards for defining what is right and what is wrong. Character would seem to be a personal attribute, while custom is defined by a group over time. People have character. Societies have custom. To violate either can be said to be wrong, within its appropriate frame of reference.

It is possible to draw an objective distinction between good and bad, right and wrong, which does not depend on context for a measuring stick. Let us say that good, or right, would be the quality of those things which tend toward the greatest survival for the greatest cross-section of life and bad, or wrong, would apply to those things which tend away from that greatest survival. This is a standard which can be objectively tested for, in theory.

While an objective standard of right and wrong may be desirable, this is not to say that objective standards and subjective standards are complete strangers to each other, necessarily. After all, social mores are seldom entirely arbitrary. They are adopted by societies during the natural course of events because at one time or another this or that rule is seen as beneficial to the survival of the group as a group. Members who subscribe to the rules of the society arguably see survival potential in them.

One might take Jewish dietary laws as an example of a subjective standard, in that compliance with them is rooted in faith rather than having been arrived at through research. Empirical observation in biblical and pre-biblical times, however, provided objective evidence aplenty for the necessity of dietary rules in the absence of such recent advancements as antibiotics and refrigeration. In early times, then, violation of dietary law may well have been "bad" or "wrong" by any standard. Nonetheless, obedience to such dietary law now may safely be classed as an issue of custom more than character.

While those of faith will argue that their custom is dictated by the Supreme Authority and as such establishes an asolute standard for both a morals and ethics (making them indistiguishable within that milleu), we may still discuss how what is "moral" may not be "right" by objective criteria, and vice-versa.

Consider: It is moral, within the context of their society, for native African cannibals to eat their enemies. Judeo-Christian morality declares this practice sinful. One may argue on one hand that such practice is harmless in the context of a hunter-gatherer economy which relies on scarce resources and to which overpopulation is anathema. On closer inspection, however, we find that a neurologic disorder, possibly of genetic (or viral?) origin literally causes the physical deterioration of the brains of some mammals, including humans, who practice cannibalism. This has been responsible for destructive epidemics among cannibalistic tribes, and so unqualifiedly militates against their survival. By objective standards, then, we might find that cannibalism is "bad." And not because this or that social standard says so, but because it is insidiously destroying populations who practice it. But one discovers this only by moving outside of the social structure of cannibalism and applying some science.

Note that governmental bodies and professions such as medicine and the law have developed codes of conduct for their members. These are called ethical codes, and not moral codes. Morality, being custom-based, relies heavily on the mores of the society - which tend to have religious origins. Therefore, in the field of morals, one talks of such things as "sin" and "virtue". In the field of professional ethics, the discussion tends to revolve around responsibility, duty, and benefit vs negligence, betrayal and harm. There is an obvious effort in the field of civic and professional ethics to establish and follow an objective standard based upon the concrete consequences of one's acts.

The founder (and to a lesser degree, subsequent leaders) of a social grouping may see a necessity for a given type of behavior in a purely ethical sense. "We must do this or perish." He may attempt to educate others as to the necessity of the behavior which he prescribes. How likely is it, though, that the followers, adherents, members or what-have-you will share their leader's insights and understanding? One of the reasons they are sheep instead of shepherds is that they sense a superior ability to survive in the guy holding the staff. So, when education fails, when personal wisdom and responsibility are inadequate, rules, threats and punishments are established. Now we have moved from the field of ethics, founded in personal character - and into the field of morals, founded in approval by authority.

Ethically, there may be such things as neutral-value activities. Walking around naked, using profanity, painting one's car fuscia - all may have no innate implications as to survivability in and of themselves. However, one may quickly find that one's activites have impact on the sensory and emotional states of others. As such, violating a social more or "good taste," even if it carries no penalty, interferes with the smooth passage of others through life and in such a miniscule fashion reduces the general survival. This fact can make the violation of moral standards an unethical act because of the turmoil created.

So - things can be innately good or bad, all social standards aside. A person of character might learn what he can about the world around him; determine what will positively or negatively impact it; resolve to support the former, and strive against the latter. Such a person by any standard would probably have to be classified as ethical. Some social groups might find his actions offensive or sinful, but if he is honest about his observations, possesses personal integrity, and is true to values which embrace working maximum benefit and minimum harm - for their own sake - we could not but call him ethical.

Ralph Waldo Emerson almost grasped this fully over two hundred years ago in his essay, "Self-Reliance." He railed against the political sycophants and religious hypocrites of his day, pointing out that their values obtained to self-aggrandizement and social popularity, but not to the general good. Therefore, they were untrue to themselves.

EthicalRelativism holds that good and bad exist only by reference to human social standards. I believe it can be successfully argued that while moral behavior must needs be so referenced, ethical behavior can be determined on its own merit, relative only to its bare consequences as, like ripples from a pebble tossed into a pond, they travel out into the universe. The only limitation which would exist, therefore, on the ability of a person to be ethical would be the breadth and depth of his vision.

Another way to look at the distinction is to say that morals are accepted from an authority (cultural, religious, etc.), while ethics are accepted because they follow from personally-accepted principles. For example, if one accepts the authority of a religion, and that religion forbids stealing, then stealing would be immoral. An ethical view might be based on an idea of personal property that should not be taken without social consent (like a court order). Stealing would directly contradict that view. On the other hand, if one has different basic principles that didn't recognize an item as "property", a similar action might not be unethical. (Helping a slave escape would be ethical if one believes people should not be owned as property.)

Professional and "ethical" codes of conduct are an interesting case--they are very similar to morality in that they are often accepted and adhered to in a moral sense. For example, consider a doctor who follows a professional code of ethics, including a strong requirement to not violate the patient's privacy. The doctor discovers that a patient has a genetic/inherited disease that is treatable, and that the patient has siblings who are likely to have the same disease. The patient asks the doctor not to tell anyone (including the siblings) about the disease. The interesting question is not so much what the doctor should do, but how the doctor should come to a decision. Should the doctor follow the consensus of the professional community, even if it conflicts with personal ethics? Would it matter if the rest of the community was united or divided over the question?

I will, for now forego tackling the medical ethics question. The issue of property, however is an interesting one. It is the case that items, objects, or life forms do not possess innate qualities which make them "property" of this or that person or "not-property" of anyone. How, then, would one apply an ethical standard to the issue of theft which is not grounded in a societal or moral code? Mr. Adams makes the case that, "An ethical view might be based on an idea of personal property that should not be taken without social consent..." but why? Ethics require not mere assumptions, but reason leading to conclusions. In order to hold the ethical view that there is such a thing as personal property and that it ought not be taken, one must arrive there by reasononing.

What is it about a thing which makes it one's property? In one form or another, one could say that it is the chain of creation. There are two apparent chains of creation at work here, but in actuality, only one. The illusory chain of creation is "I was created the owner of this." The actual chain of creation is "I produced the effort or energy to created this, bring this about, or to bring it under my control. And I did so without wasting the effort of another." Having brought about a state of property, one may freely bestow it upon one's progeny, bringing about the illusory chain or creation.

The taking of things or property through force is only legitemized when he from whom it was taken agrees to the conquest, thereby obtaining a benefit of residing under the protection of new government, or of avoiding lethal or disabling force which would cancel his prior claim upon the property.

A person's own creative energy is in fact owned by him and to waste it works observable harm upon him and is is therefore classifiable as "bad."

A person directs his creative energy toward the accomplishment of work, and toward the making of agreements with his fellows as to what that work may be traded for. Each successive trade in a chain continues the chain of the original creation and so, even though he bought the loaf of bread instead of baking it, he created the energy which resulted in the bread and traded it to the baker so that the baker's creative efforts were not wasted.

How do people as property figure in here? As one did not in any case create another human being, (the special case of children could be argued but this is unnecessary for now as one generally does not assert property rights over his/her children), as human beings are not controllable without their consent, and as to force involuntary control over a human wastes his effort, this disqualifies human beings from being property.

Slavery, then, would be an inherently corrupt assertion of property rights.