Wikipedia 10K Redux by Reagle from Starling archive. Bugs abound!!!

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ConsequentialIsm|Talk

Your account of consequentialism seems a little unusual.  For starters, I don't think egoism is normally considered to be a kind of consquentialism.  For example, in ''Consequentialism and its critics'', the editor Samuel Scheffler starts off by saying that

: Consequentialism in its purest and simplest form is a moral doctrine which says that the right act in any given situation is the one that will produce the best overall outcome, ''as judged from an impersonal standpoint which gives equal weight to the interests of everyone.'' Somewhat more precisely, we may think of a consequentialist theory of this kind as coming in two parts.  First, it gives some principle for ranking overall states of affairs ''from an impersonal standpoint'' and then it says that the right act in any given situation is the one that will produce the highest ranked state of affairs that the agent is in a position to produce. (emphasis added).

There may be a few people who talk differently, but this certainly appears to be the standard conception of consequentialism (the less "pure" forms alluded to presumably being indirect forms of consequentialism, or views where the welfare of some individuals (but still individuals ''impersonally considered'') are considered to be more important (as in, for example, the kind of consequentialism David Brink presents in "The Separateness of Persons, Distributive Norms, and Moral Theory").

I think the same problem arises in your blurring of the distinction between consequentialist theories and deontological, or, more generally and simply, non-consequentialist theories.   It ''has'' in fact been argued, by David Cummiskey in ''Kantian consquentialism'', that although Kant was firmly against consequentialism, Kantian moral theory, "properly understood, generates an extremely compelling consequentialist normative theory".  However, I believe this is a very unusual position to take, and even if it makes sense, there is still a sensible class of positions to put up against consequentialist positions.

This class of positions is characterized by the idea that there are ''agent-relative'' or '' agent-centered'' reasons for action, whereas for consquentialism, as defined above, reasons for action are ultimately ''agent-neutral''.   Then egoism and deontology are seen as characteristically non-consequentialist.

These days it has become standard to distinguish between agent-centered ''restrictions'' and agent-centered ''prerogatives''.   I am tempted to agree, with Scheffler, that ultimately, agent-centered restrictions are difficult to defend. As you suggest against Kant, why should I not kill one innocent person if, by doing so, I can save the lives of many more innoncent persons in exactly the same objective circumstances?  On the other hand, agent-centered prerogatives seem much easier to defend, on the familiar grounds that consequentialist theories are morally too demanding.  Given the protean nature of indirect consequentialism, however, the field is very murky. --CalvinOstrum
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I think it's common enough to regard EgoIsm as a variety of consequentialism.  Just as data points, see [http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/c/conseque.htm this article] and [http://www.mc.maricopa.edu/users/vaughan/text/lex/defs/consequentialism.html this one].  This is how I've been taught the notion and how I taught it (as a T.A.) to Ohio State undergrads.  But, granted, it does sound a little bit strange.  I would add some sort of note, at the very least, that not everyone would consider EthicalEgoism a variety of consequentialism. -- [[Larry Sanger]]

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Hmm, those two citations are of very poor quality.  In looking at standard collections of recent higher-quality essays from the research literature, such as those contained in the aforementioned ''Consequentialism and its critics'', or Philip Pettit's 1993 edited volume of 26 papers, it seems to me that all of them either implicitly or explicitly assume that consequentialism ultimately countenances only agent-neutral reasons.  I think the issue of agent-neutral versus agent-relative reasons is the crucial issue here, in any case.  I think WillWilkinson is right about this, and I think the community of moral philosophers essentially agree.   Consequently, I would submit that the term "consequentialism" ''should'' only be used to refer to theories which say that ultimately only agent-neutral reasons are of import.  Consequentialism should be the view that only consequences matter.  Consequences, ''period'', not consequences for me when I act, or you when you act.  -- CalvinOstrum

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I'm very suspicious of any claim to the effect that words, particularly jargon, ''ought'' to mean anything; either they do or they don't.  If, as I think is clearly the case, there is ''some'' reasonably large portion of philosophers who use "consequentialism" to mean a broader concept than that meant by your sources, then the word is, as a matter of fact, whether you like it or not, ambiguous.  And the article should reflect that fact.  (While perhaps also acknowledging some popular distaste for one of the uses of the term.)  Besides, some word is needed, after all, for the concept that actions are to be evaluated based on their consequences, whether ''for'' everyone or ''for'' the agent only.  Utilitarianism and egoism have something in common that deontological theories don't have.  That's why "consequentialism" is sometimes used in this broader way. -- [[Larry Sanger]]

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Suit yourself. I don't expect much in an "encylopedia" run by Objectivists!   -- CalvinOstrum

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Just for the record, I don't regard myself as an Objectivist, and I will do my best not to let it be overrun by them.  :-)  Not that I have any serious beefs with Objectivists.  This wiki will become whatever its participants make it.  -- [[Larry Sanger]]

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You are at least a Fellow Traveller, as WillWilkinson seems also to be.  -- CalvinOstrum

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Maybe--but officially, I hold no views.  ;-) -- [[Larry Sanger]]